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Article 4

PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOANALYSIS, AND THE
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES*
David B. Saxe**

[T]he students of the life of the mind in health and disease, should combine
with students of the law in a scientific and deliberate effort to frame a
definition, and a system of administration, that will combine efficiency
with truth.
Cardozo, Law and Literature

I. Introduction
The manifest purpose of any legal proceeding is the rendition of a fair and
just decision. This purpose is either helped or hindered by the means and
methods available to courts for ascertaining the truth or falsity of contentions
presented. By far the most effective means of ascertaining truth is through the
testimony given by witnesses in open court, and the jury must base its findings
on such testimony. Ordinarily the jury, in evaluating the credibility of a witness,
will be concerned with his memory, observational powers, and narrative ability.
When, however, the witness suffers from some behavioral pathology or mental
disorder, another dimension is added to the problem of fact finding.
A behavioral disorder may significantly undermine a witness's credibility.'
The difficulty is further compounded for the jury, because behavioral pathology
is often difficult for the untrained observer to detect. Distortion of truth by
witnesses suffering from behavioral disorders is the result of deeply-rooted emotional conflicts, while the distortion of mentally normal witnesses is generally
the result of clear and understandable motivation or simply the normal failings
of memory or observation.2 The need for a trained observer or expert to report
on these behavioral pathologies is evident. Such an expert, by reason of his
training in the behavioral pathologies, is the psychiatrist. His testimony, directed
to the jury, would provide a distinct aid in the evaluation of witnesses' credibility.
Expert opinion is especially vital today, since early common-law requirements for testing the competency of mentally deranged witnesses have been
severely restricted.' At common law, "insane" persons and "idiots" were incompetent to testify.4 This absolute ban against mentally deranged persons has
been modified; now, in order to disqualify a witness on the basis of mental derangement, the derangement must be such as would substantially impair the
Copyright © 1968 by David B. Saxe. All rights reserved.
A.B., Columbia College (1963); J.D., Western Reserve University School of Law
(1966); Member of the New York, Ohio, and Court of Military Appeals Bars; Assistant Professor of Law, City University of New York.
1 D. HENDERSON & R. GILLESPIE, A TExT-BooK OF PSYCHIATRY 112 (8th ed. 1956);
Davidson, Appraisal of the Witness, 110 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 481 (1954).
2 Altshuler, The Psychopathology of Lying, J. NEUROLOGY & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 20
(1925).
3 See Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, Inc., 394 Ill. 569, 577, 69 N.B.2d 293,
297 (1946); State v. Schweider, 5 Wis. 2d 627, -,
94 N.W.2d 154, 157 (1959); 2 J. WIGmoR, EVID-NcE §§ 492, 501, at 583-84, 594 (3d ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as WiomoRE].
4 Authorities and cases are collected in 2 WIGMORE § 492, at 583-84 & n.4.
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witness's "trustworthiness upon the specific subject of testimony."5 So long as
the derangement does not prevent the witness from having the ability to observe,
recollect, and communicate the subject of the testimony, he may testify.'
In nearly all instances today, a witness is presumed competent to testify unless
facts appear to negate that presumption.7 The question of competency is decided
by the court8 out of the jury's presence, although in one leading case,' the court
said that the jury may be present, in the trial judge's discretion, since questions
of credibility might be raised.1" With this relaxation of the old competency requirements,"1 a witness who may be suffering from a marked behavioral pathology
is considered competent to testify. Upon the jury, then, falls the task of determining the degree to which this pathology will affect the witness's ability to tell
the truth.
The idea of introducing psychiatric testimony to aid the jury in ascertaining
the truth is not new. In 1906, Sigmund Freud, in a lecture to a law class at the
University of Vienna entitled "Psycho-Analysis and the Ascertaining of Truth in
Courts of Law," stated:
There is a growing recognition of the untrustworthiness of statements
made by witnesses, at present the basis of so many judgments [sic] in Courts
of Law; and this has quickened in all of you, who are to become judges
and advocates, an interest in a new method of investigation, the purpose of
which is to lead the accused person to establish his own guilt or innocence
objectively. This method is of a psychological and experimental character,
and is based upon psychological research; it is closely connected with certain
views which have only recently been propounded in medical psychology.' 2
Freud, however, was less than optimistic about linking psychoanalysis and the
law; and when, in 1924, he was offered a large sum of money by Colonel McCormick of the Chicago Tribune to come to the United States to "psychoanalyze"
Leopold and Loeb, he declined the offer stating: "I would say that I cannot be
supposed to be prepared to provide an expert opinion about persons and a deed
when I have only newspaper reports to go on and have no opportunity to make
a personal examination."'
In 1908, Harvard professor of psychology Hugo Miinsterberg suggested that
the method of applied psychology could be used to test the reliability of witnesses
prior to introduction of their testimony in court.
5 2 WIGOoRE § 492, at 585. In State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 602, 143 A.2d 530, 554
(1958), the court stated: "Where there is evidence of mental derangement or feeblemindedness, the inquiry is whether the deficiency is sufficient to render his testimony untrustworthy."
6 People v. Nash, 36 Ill. 2d 275, 279, 222 N.E.2d 473, 475 (1966); People v. Dixon, 22
Ill. 2d 513, 516, 177 N.E.2d 224, 225 (1964); 2 WIOMO E §§ 493-95, at 586-88; cf. Annot.,
148 A.L.R. 1140 (1944).
7 2 WGMoRE, §§ 484, 497, at 521, 588.
8 2 WiGmzoRB §§ 487, 497, at 523, 590 & n.6.
9 State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958).
10 Id. at 605, 143 A.2d at 555. The court, quoting the Hiss case, said that "[t]he existence
of insanity or mental derangement is admissible for the purpose of discrediting a witness. Evidence of insanity is not merely for the judge on the preliminary question of competency, but
goes to the jury to affect credibility."
11 See Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IowA L. Rv. 482 (1939).
12 S. FRauD, Psycho-Analysis and the Ascertaining of Truth in Courts of Law, in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS 13 (E. Jones ed. 1948).
13 3 E. JoNES, THE LIFE AND WORN OF SIGMUND FRawrD 103 (1953).
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[W]hile the court makes the fullest use of all the modem scientific methods
when, for instance, a drop of dried blood is to be examined in a murder
case, the same court is completely satisfied with the most unscientific and
haphazard methods of common prejudice and ignorance when a mental
product, especially the memory report of a witness, is to be examined. No
juryman would be expected to follow his general impressions in the question
as to whether the blood on the murderer's shirt is human or animal. But he
is expected to make up his mind as to whether the memory ideas of a witness are objective reproductions of earlier experience or are mixed up with
associations and suggestions. The court proceeds as if the physiological
chemistry of blood examination had made wonderful progress, while experimental psychology, with its efforts to analyse the mental faculties, still stood
where it stood two thousand years ago.' 4
Professor Mfinsterberg further warned:
The courts will have to learn... that the individual differences of men
can be tested... by the methods of experimental psychology. ... Modem
law welcomes, for instance, for identification of criminals all the discoveries
of anatomists and physiologists as to the individual differences.... But no
one asks for the striking differences as to those mental details which the
psychological experiments on memory and attention, on feeling and imagination, on perception and discrimination, on judgment and suggestion, on
emotion and volition, have brought out in the last decade.' 5
The following year Professor Wigrnore, in a devastatingly satirical article, attacked Mflnsterberg's assumptions on the grounds that there were no precise
scientific methods for evaluating the testimonial reliability of witnesses." Perhaps
due to Professor Wigmore's preeminence in the legal profession, his discrediting of
Miinsterberg's theories caused a hiatus in scientific and legal interest in the general
problem area of testimonial credibility."?
The purpose of this article is to describe the methods and means by which
psychiatric testimony may aid a jury in formulating views on witnesses' credibility
and to survey the current legal status of such psychiatric testimony.
II. Behavioral Pathology Affecting Credibility
Since mental disturbance in the human organism varies in kind and degree,
this section surveys the major areas of behavioral pathology in order to relate
mental abnormalities to the problems of credibility.
A. Psychoses
In this category are included schizophrenia, affective manic psychosis, pamnoid states, and senile psychosis.
14

15
16

H.

MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 44-45 (1913).
Id. at 63.
Wigmore, Professor Mifnsterberg and the Psychology of Testimony, 3 ILL. L. REv. 399

(1909).
17 See Burtt,

LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY

8-10 (1931). Mfinsterberg also had a war of words, in

a series of articles with another attorney, Charles Moore. This is recounted in Rouke, Psychological Research on Problems of Testimony, 13 J. SOCIAL IssuEs, No. 2, 1957, at 50, 50-51.
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1. Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is a disorder in the organization of communication; this results
in a profound alteration of the subject's self-experience and his experience of
the world." Implied is a fundamental breakdown in the psychobiological equipment by which information is coded and decoded. A state of fluidity arises so
that the self becomes intensely magnified and the world as reconstructed through
hallucinations, delusions, and illusions revolves around the individual. There
results a "concomitant loss of focus and coherence and a profound shift in the
meaning and value of social relationships and goal-directed behavior."' 9 For the
schizophrene, "each and every event and personal interaction acquires a special
magical and often uncanny significance. These interpretations are unshared and
lead rapidly to enormous isolation or autism and to a: profoundly unrealistic
assessment of reality ....
20
The schizophrene has an altered experience of the internal and external
world-a loss of his moorings to reality.2" He exists in a state of fluidity with a
loss of conventional perspectives so that the self becomes intensely magnified and
the world, as reconstructed through hallucinations, delusions, and illusions, revolves around him.'s
While the schizophrene's testimony is properly open to attack, schizophrenia
may be difficult to detect.
2. Manic-depressive Psychosis
The manic-depressive is characterized by a disturbance of behavior and
thought corresponding to various mood changes; he alternates between extremes
of excitement and depression. In the excited state the manic is hyperkinetic,
talkative, and overexuberant. s To him, "nothing and nobody else counts."24
Lack of guilt and shame run concurrently with his "supreme self-esteem." 2
Although his thinking is often delusional, the delusions are restrained to the point
that the manic's behavior is not clearly removed from reality2 6
Laymen often fail to perceive this psychosis, because there is no definite
change in the subject's identity.Y "His overconfidence makes him more positive
on the witness stand than the facts warrant. His radiant euphoria often makes
18

F. REDLICH &

19 Id.

D.

FREEDMAN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 463 (1966).

20 Id. at 464. One means by which intrapsychic stability is maintained is through the
proper functioning of the informational process. The dissolution of this communication involves "a shift of attention and activity from an engagement with normal communications to
an absorption in the self, to an occupation with simply maintaining stability and basic bound-

aries." Id. at 463.
21
22

Id. at 464.
Id.; L. CAMMER, OUTLINE OF PSYCHIATRY, 198-99 (1962); COMMITTEE ON NOmEN-

CLATURE AND STATISTICS, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 33-35 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as DSMI]; 0.
ENGLISH & S. FINCH, INTRODUCTION To PSYCHIATRY 332 (3d ed. 1964).

23
24

0. ENGLISH & S. FINCH, supra note 22, at 371.

F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 537.

25 Id.
26 0. ENGLISH & S. FINCH, supra note 22, at 389; Davidson, supra note 1, at 483.
27

F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 537.
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him a sort of juristic pet, who is challenged only at the peril of the cross-examiner."I Lawyers must be tactful in cross-examining such a witness.
A frontal attack on the competency of an intelligent, well-preserved manic
is almost certainly doomed to fail. In the short run, he can best the attorney
at the question-and-answer game. Skillful advocates find it tactically better
to let the witness talk on. The manic is more likely to expose his own
psychosis, given time enough, than he is to allow himself to be trapped
into such exposure by a hostile attorney.29
3. ParanoidStates
Paranoid states are psychoses characterized by the existence of grandiose or
persecutory delusions." Generally, intelligence is well preserved, emotional responses are appropriate to the ideas generated and hallucinations are uncommon." The true paranoid suffers from more than a rigid suspicion and mistrust
of others, his feelings of persecution have become permanent. When the paranoid
sees a group of people talking, and if one of the group makes a casual glance in
his direction, he will be convinced that they are discussing him. 2 Exceptionally
marked delusional thinking distinguishes paranoid states from schizophrenias
and manias in which thought and mood disorders, respectively, are the predominant abnormalities. 3
The paranoid's delusional network of rigid hostility and mistrust is often
projected in endless feuds and litigations.34 This type of individual has been
commonly labeled "litigious paranoid." Paranoid testimony, presented in the
context of a judicial proceeding, may withstand "skillful empirical testing and
...

logical inquiry." 3

The witness suffering from a paranoid state often makes good sense.
Even when the delusion system is apparent, judges and jurors are likely to
accept testimony that does not seem to impinge on the delusional network.
The psychiatrist knows that a delusional system is not watertight, that it
reflects a serious disorganization of thinking, and that spurious reasoning
is likely to contaminate all of the patient's thought processes. The nonpsychiatrist does not know this. If the witness, for example, has an obviously
psychotic delusion about politics, his testimony about a taxicab accident is
often accepted in good faith. The psychiatrist realizes, however, that a
delusion of psychotic intensity is likely to color all of the patient's thinking.36
Eventually, a clinician will discover a well-developed system of paranoid
delusions.3 The trial lawyer, however, is not a clinician, and a clever paranoid
can influence a jury not cognizant of his behavioral pathology.
28

29

H.

DAVIDSON, FoaaNsic PSYCHIATRY

259 (1965).

Id.
30 0. ENGLISH & S. FINCH, supra note 22, at 409.
31 Id.
32 0. ENGLISH & S. FINCH, supra note 22, at 410.
33 DSM 37.
34 F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 483.
35 Id.
36 H. DAvmsON, supra note 28, at 259-60.
37 F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 483.

[Vol. 45:238]

THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

4. Senile Psychosis
Senile psychosis involves a marked deterioration of all personality functions.
The predominant characteristics of senile psychosis are memory impairment,
especially as to recent events; poor judgment; and feelings of distrust."s The

afflicted witness may have an excellent recollection of past events, but he may be
unable to recall very recent events.39 The assistance of a clinician would readily
enable the lawyer to expose this condition.
B. Neuroses
1. Anxiety Neurosis
Anxiety created by inner tensions does not of itself render a witness unreliable. Neurotics suffering from deeply-rooted anxieties, however, may make
false accusations in an attempt to satisfy some disturbing intrapsychic tension.4"
Although the anxiety-ridden witness may perspire profusely and incur breathing
problems, the jury easily empathizes with him and attributes his nervousness to
the natural aversion of a layman for the witness stand.
In order to properly understand the danger presented by the anxiety-ridden
witness, a very brief explanation of the psychoanalytic theory of anxiety development is necessary. Explanation must commence with an appreciation of the roles
played by the id, the ego, and the superego. The ego is the tester of reality, the
seat of consciousness. 4 The id, on the other hand, is unconscious, containing all
basic instinctual drives. 2 The third element, superego, roughly corresponds to
what is commonly called conscience. It contains the censorship data of the individual, regulating his conception of right and wrong."3
The ego tests reality by receiving stimuli and impressions from the environment. Anxiety results when the ego is intruded upon by internal or external
stimuli unacceptable to the individual. The ego produces anxiety-a "danger
signal"-thus avoiding the intrusion of the dangerous impulse. Psychoanalytically,
this effect is referred to as the defensive operation of the ego.44' Anxiety defenses
include changes in attention, fantasy formation, and replacement of the threatening internal impulse with another less dangerous construct.45
The psychic by-products of anxiety are the crucial factors in assessing the
afflicted person's credibility as a witness. Anxious individuals must cope with
their anxieties. In this coping process, painful situations may be forgotten, distorted, or fantasized. In addition to the defensive operation of the ego, discussed
above, there are other ego-oriented processes that function primarily as defenses
to internal impulses. These processes are referred to as "defensive mechanisms."
38
39
40
41
42
43

ENGLISH & S FINCH, supra note 22, at 495-96.
Id.
Davidson, Testimonial Capacity, 39 B.U.L. REv. 172, 176 (1959).
0. ENNGLIH & S. FINCH, supra note 22, at 36.
Id.
Id. at 37-39.

0.

44

C.

45

Id.

BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY

TaxTBoox

OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

92 (1955).
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In striving to ward off anxiety and panic, the defensive mechanisms often have
the effect of reducing, distorting, or obliterating the informational content of an
anxiety-ridden witness's testimony. The anxious witness's quest for intrapsychic
stability commands these unconscious defensive mechanisms, while the court
demands truth. The neurotic attempts to follow the court's directive, but his
unconscious motivation often renders such attempts futile.
The behavioral pathology of anxiety neurosis offers a unique challenge to
medico-legal scholars concerned with the credibility of a witness. In therapy,
the repressed conflicts that produce anxiety are worked out through psychoanalytical techniques linking the genesis of the conflict with its present exploitation of the individual. This linkage provides the curative feature of the discipline. On the other hand, one noted expert claims that a witness's biography
is irrelevant to his testimony if that testimony is to be evaluated in terms of its
truth or falsity. 46 It is his position that biography is essential to evaluating an
individual's message only when the function of the message "is expressive and
directive as well as informative."4 7 This view notwithstanding, the author would
contend that a witness's past can aid a jury in evaluating his credibility. Further,
although theoretically the jury is concerned only with the infonnative function
of testimony, pragmatically it is equally concerned with the expressive and directive function. Realistically, it is not only what is said, but how it is said and by
whom it is said, that will influence the jury.'
2. Hysterical Neurosis
Hysterical neurotics engage in dramatic, exhibitionist behavior; lability of
mood; a certain childish egocentricity; and most of all, a high degree of suggestibility and gullibility.49 It is their high degree of suggestibility that leads them
to transform reality into imaginative and romantic schemes, often rendering
themselves "compelled actors."5 Hysterical neurosis in a woman may produce
false accusations of sex crimes committed against her. These accusations may
5
be the result of the hysterical behavior of the neurotic woman, ' or they may
52
be the acting out of sexual fantasies by the psychotic woman. A young girl has
intensely erotic desires, and where these urges exist and are intensified by the
55
proximity of a man, she may imagine engaging in sexual intercourse with him.
46 Slovenko, Witnesses, Psychiatry and the Credibility of Testimony, 19 U. FLA. L. REv.
1, 20 (1966).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49

F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 372.

50 Id.
51 E.g., State v. Prior, 74 Wash. 121, 132 P. 874 (1913) (holding that it was reversible
error to exclude "medical testimony" to the effect that the state's witness in a rape prosecution
was "suffering from hysteria, which caused her to have 'delusions, hallucinations . . . and illusions'" at the time the crime was allegedly committed).

52 See People v. Bastian, 330 Mich. 457, 47 N.W.2d 692 (1951); People v. Cowles, 246
Mich. 429, 224 N.W.2d 387 (1929).
53 See 3 WIGMORE § 924(a), at 459. See also Rice v. State, 195 Wis. 181, 217 N.W.
697 (1928). Reversing a rape conviction, the Wisconsin Supreme Court related the facts as
culled from the complaining girl's testimony and then observed:
The more sensible view of this matter comes from [the physician who examined the witness's mental condition] - that the child was not normal, but imagined
things entirely beyond facts and conditions. She was approaching the age of puberty,
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Psychiatric testimony regarding the credibility of sex-crime prosecutrices is distinctly necessary. First, the accusations of a sex crime arouse community sympathy, especially if the prosecutrix is a young, virginal-looking girl." Second,
the accusations are difficult to defend due to the common-law rule that the testimony of the prosecutrix in a rape case is alone sufficient for corroboration. s
Third, penalties may be severe. Many courts, although disapproving of psychiatric
testimony in other areas, allow such evaluation in prosecutions for sex crimes.55
This evidence must be admitted, if at all, under the impeachment rule. As the
court stated in People v. Cowles:
The testimony should have been received, not in extenuation of rape, but
for its bearing upon the question of the weight to be accorded the testimony
of the girl and the question of whether the mind of the girl was so warped
by sexual contemplation and desires as to lead her to57accept the imagined
as real, or to fabricate a claimed sexual experience.
Other courts will not admit psychiatric testimony in this area.s In Wedmore v.
State, ' where the defendant was charged with carnal knowledge of a girl under
sixteen years of age, the court said:
We do not believe this court has the power or authority to require the
State to support the testimony of a prosecuting witness in a sex case by
requiring her to submit to a psychiatric examination, the report60 of which
is to be presented in evidence, in order to sustain a conviction.
Dean Wigmore has suggested that "No judge should ever let a sex-offense
charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's life history and mental
makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician."6 ' Other
commentators favor such examinations only when there is no corroborating evidence.'2 It is this writer's contention that the liberal attitude of those courts
admitting psychiatric evidence is desirable. A requirement of a pretrial psychiatric examination of the sex-complainant is not unduly onerous in view of the
potential injustice if such a procedure is not pursued.
when her mind might have been disturbed by her mental condition. The charitable
view is that she was not responsible for her improbable stories; rather that they were
the figments of her abnormal condition. Id. at 217 N.W. at 698-99.
54 3 WixmoRE § 924(a), at 459.
55 7 WIrORE § 2061, at 342. This rule has been eroded in some states by decisions
requiring corroboration by additional evidence. E.g., People v. Romano, 279 N.Y. 392, 18
N.E.2d 634 (1939). The same effect has been achieved legislatively. E.g., N.Y. PENAL CoDo
§ 2013 (McKinney 1967). In some states, very little corroboration is demanded. For example,
in People v. DeFrates, 395 Ill. 439, 70 N.E.2d 591 '(1946), the complainant's prompt disclosure of the act was deemed sufficient.
56 E.g., State v. Wesler, 137 N.J.L. 311, 59 A.2d 834, aff'd, 1 N.J. 58, 61 A.2d 746
(1948); People v. Bastian, 330 Mich. 457, 47 N.W.2d 692 (1951); Ellarson v. Ellarson, 198
App. Div. 103, 190 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1921) ; Miller v. State, 49 Okla. Crim. 133, 295 P. 403
(1930); Rice v. State, 195 Wis. 181, 217 N.W. 697 (1928).
57 People v. Cowles, 246 Mich. 429, 431, 224 N.W. 387, 388 (1929).
58 E.g., State v. Driver, 88 W.Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 '(1921).
59 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957).
60 Id. at 223, 143 N.E.2d at 654.
61 3 WIGMORE § 924(a), at 460.
62
Comment, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 651, 654; Note, PsychiatricAid in Evaluating the Credibility Of a Prosecuting Witness Charging Rape, 26 IND. L.J. 98, 102 (1950).
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C. Antisocial Personality
The old psychiatric nomenclature referred to antisocial behavior as "sociopathic" or "psychopathic." These terms have recently fallen into disrepute
and have been replaced by the term antisocial personality. 3 This term
is reserved for basically unsocialized persons whose behavior pattern brings them
repeatedly into conflict with society.6" They do not suffer from the inner turmoil
that afflicts the neurotic individual. On the contrary, they make others suffer
and are not concerned with or bothered by fear, guilt, or shame.6" Being callous
and hedonistic, they are able to rationalize their behavior to themselves. These are
the charming scoundrels who lie with impunity, intelligence, and wit.6 In short, the
antisocial personality may be an imposing witness for an attorney to confront; he
simply cannot grasp the meaning or essence of a falsehood. His disregard for the
truth in this sense is remarkable; "[w]hile committing the most serious of perjuries,
' 67
it is easy for him to look anyone calmly in the eye.
The jury has a particularly difficult task in understanding the attorney's
attack on the credibility of the antisocial witness. A juror understands that a witness may lie to avoid the consequences of the accusations brought against him.
But this type of individual may lie where there is nothing to gain from his false
testimony (except, perhaps, the satisfaction of some childish desire for notoriety.)6s The jury then sees no reason to disbelieve the witness. After all, his testimony is not self-serving and may even be detrimental to him. The manner
of evaluating a witness is based on the jury's conception of normal motivation in
human behavior; but the antisocial witness confuses the jury by "his use of the
witness stand as a vehicle of aggression and hostility ... and his willingness to
wreak mischief even at the cost of degrading himself."69 As one expert has noted:
The psychiatrist would know that the psychopath bears false witness because
he enjoys being in the limelight (even if he degrades himself); or to vent an
unconscious hostility. But this is too subtle a motivation for the average
juror ....

The malevolence which drives a psychopath into a testimonial

network of lies is utterly beyond the ken of the psychiatrically unlearned

jurist or juror.70
63
64

DSM 43.
Id.

F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 350.
66 Id. at 392-95.
67 1 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 581 (S. Arieti ed. 1959).
68 In this respect the behavior of the antisocial personality parallels that of the hysterical
neurotic. Perhaps the most poignant example to be found in American history of the vicious
effects that the tainted testimony of these types of persons can have on the fate of the accused
resulted from what has come to be known as the Salem Witch Trials. In 1692 twenty people
were convicted of being witches and hanged. Their accusers were a group of young girls that
"in modem terms . . . in one degree or another, had hysteria." M. STARKEY, THE DEVIL IN
MASSACHUSETTS 45 (Anchor ed. 1969).
In analyzing the actions of the afflicted witnesses, Marion Starkey observed that:
The girls . . . were having a wonderful time. Their present notoriety was infinitely rewarding to childish natures beset by infantile cravings for attention. Hitherto
snubbed and disregarded, they were now cosseted and made much of. They could
hardly have attracted more notice if among them they had married the king and all
his court. Id. at 47.
69 H. DAVIDSON, supra note 28, at 270.
70 Davidson, Testimonial Capacity, 39 B.U.L. REV. 172, 179 (1959). The entire area of
the psychopathology of accusation would make for fruitful inquiry as Dr. Davidson points out.
65
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The difficulty in diagnosing antisocial personality is great, and clinical
observations of such a person would probably not suffice. Unlike the psychotic,
the antisocial personality retains a firm grasp on reality. 1 A complete life history
of the subject would be required. This would render the testifying psychiatrist
vulnerable to the charge that his opinion as to the credibility of the witness is
not based on a clinical examination of the witness. One commentator believes
that by correlating the witness's behavioral pathology into a diagnostic lifepattern, a psychiatrist may be capable of distinguishing the normal liar from the
pathological liar, thus aiding the attorney in the formidable task of attacking
the credibility of this charming scoundrel."2 Two objections to this suggestion are
immediately evident. The correlation of such an individual's behavior into a
diagnostic life-pattern might often be hopelessly difficult and time consuming
due to the problem of assembling and collating biographical data. The second
objection is even more cogent. Assuming that a diagnostic life history of antisocial behavior could be "worked up," the psychiatrist would be testifying on
the basis of biography rather than clinical observation. Although this method
may, in many instances, reveal as much satisfactory and acceptable evidence of
behavioral pathology as a clinical examination, the jury would be aware of the
basis for the opinion and conceivably would react unfavorably to this method
of evaluation. In addition, this approach leaves the expert and his testimony
vulnerable to the type of skillful cross-examination found in the famous case of
5
United States v. Hiss."
D. Mental Retardation
Mental defectives are classified as idiots, imbeciles, or morons."' A subnormal
is an unreliable witness because of limitations on his powers of observation and
because of his propensity to be easily led into "traps" by an attorney.7 5 The crossexaminer might expose the subnormal condition by showing that the witness
has had a very limited education and by obtaining reports on the witness's intelligence quotient.7 One commentator, at least, hints that it may be dangerous to
rely on an intelligence quotient for impeachment purposes, since it is not possible
to accurately fix a cut-off point for mental retardation. 7
See also E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); Orenstein, Examination of the
Complaining Witness in a Criminal Court, 107 Am. J. PSYCHATRY 684 (1951).
71 1 AmIERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 67, at 581.

72 Note, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J. 1324,

1330 (1950).
73 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
948 (1951).
74 D. HENDERSON & R. GILLESPIE, supra note 1, at 570-72; see also 0. ENGLISH & S.
FINCH, supra note 22, at 510-12.
75 See Davidson, supra note 1, at 484. If the event can be broadly described, the witness
may be credible. But if detailed observation is needed, the mental defective fails because of
his "deficient powers of observation and his inability to paint a vivid verbal picture." Id.
76 Id. This procedure might be offensive to the jury.
77 0. ENGLISH & S. FINCH, supra note 22, at 508-9.
It is recognized that the intelligence quotient should not be the only criterion used
in making a diagnosis of mental retardation or in evaluating its severity. It should
serve only to help in making a clinical judgment of the patient's adaptive behavioral
capacity. This judgment should also be based on an evaluation of the patient's developmental history and present functioning, including academic and vocational

achievement, motor skills, and social and emotional maturity. DSM 14.
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E. Alcoholism
Chronic alcoholics suffering from a type of chronic brain syndrome known
as Korsakov's psychosis,"8 are characterized by memory impairment, disorientation, and confabulation.7" The alcoholic is a dangerous witness, even when not
intoxicated. He "is not only unreliable, but may be peculiarly pernicious for out
of fantasy may come all sorts of false but persistent accusations."8 0 Psychiatrists
know that a chronic alcoholic is an unreliable observer, that he is often "at the
mercy of mixed and unpredictable emotions, given to periods of mawkish sentimentality and emotional instability."'" Probing deeply into the drinking habits
of a witness might elicit some vital information, but unless the judge has a
sufficiently sophisticated view of the problem, the attorney is likely to be thwarted
rather abruptly in his inquiry. 2
F. Drug Dependence
Drug addiction or dependence does not disqualify a witness.83 A diagnosis
of drug dependence "requires evidence of habitual use or a clear sense of need
for the drug."8 " Unless the drug user is "acutely under the influence of the
drug," he can be a reliable witness, 5 although some psychiatrists believe that
drug dependence renders the addict untrustworthy and unreliable.8 6 More recent
writers have taken a contrary position. Dr. Davidson has noted that "[I]f he
could maintain a steady and unvarying supply of his drug, the addict would,
for all practical purposes, be normal."87 With the present conflict of medical
opinion on the subject of drug dependence, psychiatric testimony that addicts are
habitually untrustworthy witnesses could be given little weight.
Disagreement also exists as to the extent drug dependence may affect a
witness's capacity to observe, recollect, and narrate.88 Should further research
convincingly demonstrate the adverse effects of drug dependence on a witness's
memory, reliability, and perception, then, as one writer has observed, "the implementation of psychiatric testimony at a trial would not be difficult. A definitive
diagnosis of addiction can usually be accomplished simply and within the temporal confines of the litigation. The primary basis of the diagnosis is withdrawal
symptoms.... "89 If medical research provides some definite guidelines on the
DSM 25. See 0. ENGLISH & S. FINCH, supra note 22, at 470-74.
79 Confabulation is a term used to describe the compensatory filling of memory gaps.
Davidson, supra note 40, at 177.
80 Id. at 178.
81 Id. at 177.
82 Id.
83 Brown v. United States, 222 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1955); People v. Hamby, 6 Ill. 2d
559, 562, 129 N.E.2d 746, 748 (1955); Commonwealth v. Farrell, 319 Pa. 441, 444, 181 A.
217, 218 (1935). The courts, and psychiatrists, are in conflict as to the effect of drug dependence on credibility. See Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A
Suggested Approach, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 648, 676-79 (1960).
84 DSM 45.
85 Davidson, supra note 40, at 178.
86 See Mack, Forensic Psychiatry and the Witness - A Survey, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. Rnv.
302, 311 (1958).
87 Id.
88 Juviler, supra note 83, at 678.
89 Id. This observation is not entirely accurate since withdrawal symptoms may be entirely
absent with marihuana or cocaine. DSM 45.
78
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effect of drug dependence on credibility, it would be proper to allow expert
testimony to be introduced so that the effect of drig dependence on credibility
might be understood more clearly and be of assistance to the legal process.
III. Psychiatric Method of Evaluating Witness
The discussion thus far has focused on some of the more significant behavioral pathologies and the possible effect of such disturbances on the ability
of a witness to testify truthfully. Now the significant problem of evaluating the
methods of psychiatry in assessing credibility must be considered; specifically,
the grounds upon which a psychiatrist may base his testimony and the extent to
which the basis for his assessment may be adequate for impeachment purposes
must be examined.
A., Clinical Examination
It has been suggested that clinical examination of witnesses is the most
reliable basis for psychiatric opinion introduced into the courtroom."0 The clinical
examination by a psychiatrist involves a study of the subject as a "psychobiological
whole"; physical and mental examination, aided by psychoanalytical technique
and psychological testing devices, is necessary to evaluate an individual's total
personality. The disclosure of mental abnormalities can be accomplished through
the use of a proper psychiatric interview, noninquisitorial in nature, that will
provide some insight into the behavior of the witness. Requiring a witness to
submit to lengthy examination, while clinically desirable, is not the ideal manner
of uncoveriig intrapsychic processes. We do not live in an ideal world, and less
than perfect means of providing answers must be utilized. A more abbreviated
psychiatric examination, reinforced by other biographical data, would enable a
psychiatrist to present a meaningful, although not complete, diagnosis of the prospective witness. This procedure would allow a court or jury to make a more
realistic evaluation of the testimonial credibility of a witness.
One writer, critically examining the method of clinical diagnosis as a device
for the assessment of credibility, has asked:
[I]s he [the psychiatrist] able to detect it [a lie] when the witness has talked
over the matter with him in psychotherapy? Theodor Reik in his book
The Unknown Murderer says that psychoanalysis has no contribution to
make to evidence of guilt, as it is concerned with mental (inner) reality

rather than material (outer) reality. A therapist does not check on material reality. He is ordinarily concerned with the patient's view of the
world rather than what the world actually is. He does not cross-question
the patient. Some therapists say that outside information about the patient
interferes with their clinical work, and they prefer to close their eyes to it.
They know the situation only through the eyes of the patient. Something
more, then, is needed to test veracity.9 '
90 Comment, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YAL
1324, 1339 (1950).
91 Slovenko, supra note 46, at 16-17.
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This objection to the role of analytic (clinical) technique in the process of truth
assessment is, though articulate, not the most significant or prevalent argument
utilized by opponents of psychiatric expert testimony in matters of credibility.
Moreover, the inner reality of a person may indeed have significance in judging
a person's credibility. The conflicts, anxieties, and other behavioral pathologies
discussed have roots in deep-seated, emotionally charged situational experiences.
The patient's view of the world is meaningful if we realize that the "exploitation
of the genetic dimension" 92 may uncover, in the process, the developmental conflicts that cause distortions and unconscious motivations.
A second problem involves the authority of a court to order psychiatric
examination of a witness. The majority of courts that have ruled on this question have held that a trial court has discretion to order such an examination under
the doctrine of "implied" or "inherent" judicial power, but failure to do so is
not an abuse of this discretion.9" Generally, the cases do not indicate the standards
to govern this discretion, but in State v. Butler,9 the court held that there must
be a "substantial showing of need and justification."95 In this regard, Wigmore
has suggested that all female sex complainants be subjected to "careful psychiatric
scrutiny." 6 Generally, however, the courts, apparently proceeding on the theory
that such an unpleasant experience would deter innocent victims from bringing
is not an
a complaint, have held that a refusal to order such an examination
97
abuse of judicial discretion, and hence not grounds for reversal.
In harmony with this view is the policy advanced in rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 35 authorizes trial courts to order a physical
or mental examination of a party when his physical or mental condition is "in
controversy." ' Although some witnesses would not qualify as "a party," still,
where the rule does apply there is no limitation to the effect that the condition
be "immediately" or "directly" in controversy, nor is there any limitation in
rule 35 regarding the type of civil action in which it may be invoked. It would
appear, then, that for the narrow class of witnesses to whom the rule applies,
psychiatric examination to help resolve the question of credibility would be permissible. Though rule 35 does not strictly apply to nonparty witnesses, its policy
and the policy of similar state procedural rules modeled after it99 would seem
to augur well for the use of psychiatric clinical data. Behavioral disorders are
not often perceived by lay judges or jurors, unsophisticated in psychiatric methodology. It is submitted, then, that trial courts ought freely allow pretrial clinical
examination of witnesses for the purpose of aiding in the assessment of their
credibility. In other sexual-abuse prosecutions, where the need for psychiatric
examination is vital, some courts have displayed a medieval attitude toward
92 Id. at 20.
93 See, e.g., Mangrum v. State, 227 Ark. 381, 299 S.W.2d 80 (1957); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 612, 70 S.E.2d 293, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 880 (1952).
94 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958).
95 Id. at 605, 143 A.2d at 556.
96 3 WIGMORE § 924(a), at 460.
97 E.g., Wedmore v. State, 237 Ind. 212, 219-25, 143 N.E.2d 649, 652-55 (1957); see
Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1433 "(1968).
98 FED. R. Civ. P. 35; see Draper, Medical Examinations of Adversary Parties, 25 Rocxy
MT. L. REv. 163 (1953).
99 E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 3121 (McKinney 1970).
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psychiatry by refusing to order the prosecuting female to submit to a psychiatric
examination.
It is submitted that a liberal standard ought be developed to govern this
discretionary power. The standard need not be so rigorous as that articulated in
Butler, but rather ought encompass simply a good-faith demand based on a need
for adequate preparation of the defense. The standard could be more tightly
drawn in civil litigation, for the immediate consequences of a witness's behavioral
pathology may not be so severe as in a criminal prosecution, yet clinical psychiatric diagnosis ought be available on proper demand where it is dearly
necessary.
If clinical examination of witnesses is to be of value to the legal process,
the courts must control its implementation. If each party is allowed to introduce
psychiatric evidence to rebut the other side's contentions, the judicial process
will be confused by what has been euphemistically labeled the "battle of the
experts." The court could, however, appoint one psychiatrist, an impartial
observer, whose testimony would be admitted subject to cross-examination by
either party's attorney. The parties would have no further right of offering expert
testimony. Or, perhaps, the court could appoint rotating groups of psychiatrists
who would offer testimony based upon clinical examinations, their testimony
being subject to refutation or rehabilitation by testimony of psychiatrists selected
by the parties to the litigation. But court-appointed psychiatrists, like other
appointed experts, present numerous problems. It is apparent that the psychiatrist, although attempting to report clinical data truthfully, has an orientation depending upon his psychiatric training.
Dr. Guttmacher and others foresee the possibility that the psychiatric examination might profitably be conducted under the auspices and supervision of a
state mental institution or adult psychiatric clinic' 0
Yet, as one authority
cogently argues, the bias still exists.' The neutral or court-appointed psychiatrist
concept has recently fallen into disrepute, as such psychiatric experts often display
"a fairly medium level of clinical competence."'0 2 From another point of view,
one commentator disapproving of the impartial psychiatric witness maintains:
"There is great danger that the authority of the court psychiatrist may becomo
so overwhelming that other psychiatrists in the community are reluctant to
testify, particularly if they have a contrary opinion."'0 Elements of time, expense, and fairness are relevant here. Impartial psychiatric experts appointed on
a rotating basis by the court to conduct psychiatric examinations of witnesses
seem to this writer advisable, tempered by the right of either party to offer its
own experts at trial.
A third problem with the use of psychiatric experts revolves around the
relationship between the witness and the psychiatrist. In order for the psy100 Guttmacher, Adult Court Psychiatric Clinics, 106 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 881 (1950);
Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle of Experts: Hospital Examination of Criminal Defendants before Trial, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 419 (1935).
101 Monroe, The Psychiatric Examination, in CRIME, LAW AND CoRRECTIONS 439, 453-54
(R. Slovenko ed. 1966).
102 Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCHIVES OF CRIMINAL PSYCHODYNAMICS

103

221, 227 (1959).

Monroe, supra note 101, at 454.
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chiatrist to provide the jury with insight, there must be a level of cooperation
between witness and psychiatrist."
Analysis depends upon trust, candor, and
cooperation between the witness and psychiatrist. When the witness submits to
a psychiatric examination by order of the court, he is not likely to be completely
cooperative or candid with the psychiatrist. The witness may be fearful of disclosing information that will implicate him in a crime. This realistic possibility
of self-incrimination has been minimized by the unsound assertion of one writer
that the self-incrimination danger could be avoided by warning the psychiatrist
not to ask questions concerning the criminal behavior of the witness and forbidding him to disclose in his report to the court any incriminating evidence
that may have been revealed. 5 This suggestion places unjustifiable discretion
in the hands of the psychiatrist, who is not and does not claim to be an expert
in matters of self-incrimination. Another possible solution would be to have
counsel present at the examination in order to call to the psychiatrist's attention
the possibility of improper questioning. The psychiatrist might object to this
procedure, claiming that it would transform the clinical session into little more
than a courtroom proceeding, thus diminishing its value. The dilemma is real
and significant. One court has recently held that a court-appointed psychiatrist
could testify to admissions made by a defendant during a psychiatric examination, impliedly holding that voluntary answers to the questions of the psychiatrist waived any privilege or right against self-incrimination.',
It may be argued that examination of a witness is less likely to involve
self-incriminating statements than examination of a party. Still, examination of
a witness with antisocial personality features may easily elicit admissions to past
crimes. No satisfactory solution to this problem has yet been offered. The fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination appears broad enough to encompass a situation where a witness is required to submit to a psychiatric examination.0 7 Perhaps the only solution is to grant complete immunity to the
witness compelled to undergo psychiatric examination.0 "
104 Id. at 449-50.
105 Comment, Psychiatric Evaluatian of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J.
1324, 1341 n.98 (1950).
106 People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, -, 369 P.2d 714, 732-33, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 183-84
(1962). See also Early v. People, 142 Colo. 462, 473, 352 P.2d 112, 118, cert. denied, 364
U.S. 847, aff'd sub nom. Early v. Tinsley, 286 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
830 (1961); Commonwealth v. Butler, 405 Pa. 36, 44-45, 173 A.2d 468, 472 (1961).
107 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
108 The proposal for immunity is made because the prohibitions on the examiner advocated
in 8 WiCMoRR § 2382, at 817-21, impose too great a responsibility on the examiner to edit the
witness's responses when relating the bases for the diagnosis, and because the advent of narcoanalytical techniques in legal interrogation presents imposing problems for the safeguarding of
individual rights. See generally, J. MAcDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 72-88
(1958); Selving, Testing the Unconscious in Criminal Law Cases, 69 HAmv. L. REV. (1956);
Note, Everything But the Truth-Narco-Analysis and Its Effect Upon Confessions, 31 TEMPLE
L.Q. 359 (1958).
Aside from the problems created by the privilege against self-incrimination, there exist
in the majority of states statutes making confidential patient-physician communications privileged. For a recent compilation of the pertinent state legislation, see, Note, The Psychologist
in Criminal Proceedings,40 N.D. L. Ryv. 173, 182 (1964).
The immediate problem, of course, is whether the physician-patient, psychiatrist-patient,
or psychologist-patient relationship exists between a court-appointed expert and the witness
undergoing examinations. The privilege might be invoked for testimony of a psychiatrist on
the question of the credibility of one of his patients; but it would most likely not be invoked
where the psychiatrist was not acting as the witness's physician for therapeutic purposes but
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Once admitted into evidence, the probative value of psychiatric testimony
must be determined. The test of the probative worth of scientific evidence,
generally stated, is whether the theories and techniques upon which the scientific
findings are based have been accorded "general acceptance" among scientists
in the particular field.10 9 This test has resulted in the inadmissibility of evaluations by lie-detector tests, 10 and expert testimony on the results of narcoanalytic
examinations." 1 The probative value of psychiatric testimony would thus depend
upon the extent to which its methods have achieved general acceptance. In this
respect the reliability of clinical examinations presents a problem. Information
concerning the effectiveness in practice of clinical diagnostic systems is not
totally clear. One clinical study was made in which three psychiatrists participated."' One psychiatrist found the test patients to have serious personality
or mental deficiencies, while the other two psychiatrists found the patients to be
in the normal range. The author of the study commented:
[I]t is likely that the lack of congruity between the diagnostic label and
the complexities of the biodynamics of mental structure is itself at the heart
of diagnostic failure. No general formula seems to do full justice to the
individual
case. More probably it will violate the complexities of the
facts."13
In another study, psychiatric residents anticipated fifty-five percent of the official subtype diagnoses correctly.' 4 The study appeared to show "that the
reliability of psychiatric diagnosis diminishes as the frequency of the incidence
decreases.""'
Several explanations for the "disparities in psychiatric diagnosis have been
offered. The most satisfactory explanation is that in private practice the psychiatrist is not so much concerned with diagnosis as with treatment. It is only
when the legal process intervenes that the psychiatrist must resort to rigid classification, based on a single .period of observation. Thus a second psychiatrist
observing the same subject at another time may see and describe different bewas merely acting on behalf of the court and was conducting the examination for purposes of
later testimony before the court. See Foquette v. Bernard, 198 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1952);
Annot., 107 A.L.R. 1495 '(1937). A solution adopted by leading scholars in the field is that
the psychiatrist-patient privilege should be recognized - disclosure being compelled only when

"substantial need and justification exist." Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and Credibility,
34 GEO. WASH. L. Ravv. 53, 80 (1965); Juviler, supra note 83, at 669. See also Guttmacher
& Weihofen, Privileged Communications Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 28 IND. L.J. 32

(1952).
109

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

110 Id.
111 Commonwealth v. Kuntz, 88 Pa. D. & C. 524, 527 (Berks County Ct. 1953) ; State v.
Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 271-74, 243 P.2d 325, 334-36 (1952); see Falknor & Steffen, Evidence of Character: From the "Crucible of the Community" to the "Couch of the Psychiatrist," 102 U. PA. L. Rtv. 980 (1954); Saboff, Psychiatric Involvement in the Search for
Truth, 52 A.B.A.J. 251 (1966); cf. People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 225-26, 266 P.2d 38, 43
(1954); People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 397-98, 39 N.E.2d 925, 928-29 (1942).
112 Ash, The Reliability of PsychiatricDiagnoses, 44 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

272 (1949).
113 Id. at 276. See Mehlman, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 47 J. ABNORMAL &
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 577 (1952).
114 Schmidt & Fonda, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: A New Look, 52 J. ABNORMAL & SoCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 262, 266 (1956).

115

Id.
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havioral pathologies or fail to observe a condition that the first clinician observed
and diagnosed differently.
Perhaps disparity is inherent in any attempt to quantify human behavior to formulate a calculus of cause and effect for the human organism's behavioral
responses and actions - which the science of human behavior may never
achieve. When the notion that psychology and psychiatry must meet the same
exacting quantitative and statistical standards that prevail in the community
of the physical sciences is dispelled, it may become apparent that psychiatric
diagnostic agreement could be achieved if each psychiatrist were allowed to
present a more comprehensive description of the subject, based on study over
a period of time.
B. Diagnosis Made in Court
If the psychiatrist has not made a clinical examination of the witness, he
may be able to render a competent psychiatric opinion as to the witness's
credibility based solely upon observation in the courtroom. A witness's demeanor
on the stand is always relevant in evaluating his credibility." 6 Eccentricities of
posture, mood, and attitude could be commented on by a qualified psychiatrist.
However, "courtroom techniques for probing personality are perforce limited.""'
Were the court to allow a psychiatrist to direct the cross-examination, the doctor
would still be deprived of the direct rapport with the witness that is essential to a
professional diagnosis."" Further, such procedure is likely to cause undue delay
and confusion in the conduct of the trial.
Courtroom techniques for assessing credibility are limited to a great extent
by the hostility, fear, or reticence engendered in a witness by the foreboding
atmosphere of a courtroom and by restrictive evidentiary rules on challenging a
witness's veracity by means of extrinsic evidence."' The manner of presenting
such in-court diagnosis also gives rise to problems. Generally, the psychiatrist,
as an expert, can be asked to give his opinion through the vehicle of a hypothetical question based upon evidence introduced in court. But the hypothetical
question device has many serious, built-in objections. Hypothetical questions
may be, and often are, biased in favor of one party and misleading to the jury.'
Fortunately, judicial trend has swung away from the requirement that the
opinion of an expert be hypothetical in form and toward favoring expert testimony without first requiring the expert to specify the data upon which his conclusion is based.' 2 '
3 WIGMORE § 946, at 498.
117 Comment, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J.
1324, 1339 (1950).
118 Id. Related problems are discussed in Davidson, supra note 1, at 481-82.
119 See 3 WIGMORE § 878, at 372-73.
120 See 2 WIGMORE § 686, at 812; 2 B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 422, at 797 (5th ed. 1958).
121 Ingram v. McCuiston, 261 N.C. 392, -,
134 S.E.2d 705, 711 (1964). This trend is
reflected in the statutory rules of evidence. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
116

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, Rule 7-05 in 46
F.R.D. 161, 318-19 (1969); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 4515 (McKinney 1963); UNIFORM
RULE OF EVIDENCE 58.
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Dr. Henry Davidson, the distinguished forensic psychiatrist, is guardedly
optimistic about the possibilities of psychiatric diagnosis in court:
While a defendant is testifying, a skilled psychiatrist could sit in-the
courtroom and later give an opinion about the defendant's mental state.
Within limits this is medically sound, but legally disputable and tactically
unwise. It is medically sound, because - for the most part - psychiatric
examination consists essentially in observation. The psychiatrist looks for
his patient's mood, pressure of talk, stream of thought, brightness, orientation, content of thinking, memory, psychomotor activity, and presence or
absence of insight. If a defendant is on the witness stand long enough,
the experienced psychiatric observer can fill in most of these headings.
It is, however, second-rate testimony. It would be better if the examiner
had more time, a more cooperative patient, and access to historical details
about the defendant. But it is still possible to offer a reasonably solid
opinion about
the defendant's sanity and, within broad limits, his psychiatric
2
diagnosis.1 2

The psychiatrist who testifies on the basis of the witness's demeanor and testimony, however, runs the risk of having his diagnosis dissected and decimated
during cross-examination. A skillful cross-examiner may move a jury from viewing a constellation of facts indicating behavioral disorders to an isolated examination of separate components that by themselves may seem insignificant. A
brief look at the Hss.. trial demonstrates the dangers involved. In 1950, Alger
Hiss was prosecuted by the United States for perjury. The government's chief
witness was Whittaker Chambers. The defense sought to impeach Chambers's
testimony with psychiatric evidence depicting Chambers as a psychopathic personality with a tendency to make false accusations. The court ruled the psychiatric
testimony admissible, declaring:
It is apparent that the outcome of this trial is dependent to a great
extent upon the testimony of one man -

Whittaker Chambers.

Mr.

Chambers' credibility is one of the major issues upon which the jury must
pass. The opinion of the jury - formed upon their evaluation of all the
evidence laid before them - is the decisive authority on this question ....
The existence of ...mental derangement is admissible for the purpose
or discrediting a witness. Evidence of . . . [mental derangement] is not
merely for the judge on the preliminary question of competency, but goes
to the jury to affect credibility. 24
The psychiatric diagnosis was in part based on the courtroom demeanor of
Chambers, and in part upon his testimony at trial. The psychiatrist, Dr. Carl
Binger, testified that the psychopathic disorder afflicting Chambers had "nothing
to do with the conventional judgment of sanity."' 25 The symptoms upon which
122

Davidson, PsychiatricExamination and Civil Rights, in CmmE, LAw AND CORRECTIONS

466 (R. Slovenko ed. 1966).
123 United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951)

124 Id. at 559.
125 A. COOKE, A GENERATION ON TRIAL 305 (1950). Dr. Henry A. Murray, a Harvard
clinical psychologist, was also called as a witness. He agreed with Dr. Binger's conclusions. For
a capsule summary of Dr. Murray's testimony, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1950, at 9, col. 4.
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the psychiatrist based his diagnosis of psychopathic personality included "chronic,
persistent and repetitive lying; acts of deception and misrepresentation; alcoholism
and drug addiction; abnormal sexuality; vagabondage, panhandling, inability
to form stable attachments, and a tendency to make false accusations."' 6
The prosecutor, on cross-examination of Dr. Binger, shredded his testimony
by zealous concentration on the separate components of the psychiatric diagnosis.
The doctor had, on direct examination, attached importance to Chambers's
"untidiness." On cross-examination, the psychiatrist admitted that this trait
was manifest in such persons as Will Rogers, Owen Young, and Bing Crosby.'
Dr. Binger had further testified that Chambers habitually gazed at the ceiling,
avoiding direct contact with his examiner during the interrogation. The prosecutor told Dr. Binger:
We have made a count of the number of times you looked at the
ceiling. During the first ten minutes you looked at the ceiling nineteen
times. In the next fifteen minutes you looked up twenty times. For the
next fifteen minutes ten times and for the last fifteen minutes ten times
more. We counted a total of fifty-nine times that you looked at the ceiling
in fifty [sic] minutes. Now I was wondering whether that was any symptom
of a psychopathic personality? 2 8
"Not alone," replied Dr. Binger frostily as he shifted nervously in the witness
chair. The doctor had also testified that stealing was a psychopathic symptom.
The prosecutor asked Dr. Binger, "Did you ever take a hotel towel or a Pullman
towel?" Dr. Binger answered, "I can't swear whether I did or not, I don't think
so." The prosecutor then asked, "if any member of this jury had stolen a towel,
would that be evidence of [a] psychopathic personality?" Dr. Binger replied,
"[t]hat would have no bearing on it."' 29
This clever questioning, emphasizing individual elements of testimony, apparently distracted the jury from the consideration of the entire constellation of
antisocial personality factors allegedly evident in Chambers's life pattern. Dr.
Binger, reflecting on his courtroom experience some years later, admitted that
the cross-examination was designed to prevent consideration of the totality of
antisocial characteristics.'
The Hiss case has had a salutary effect in generating
interest in psychiatric testimony as a vehicle for more effective and legitimate impeachment procedure.
In spite of the drawbacks inherent in psychiatric diagnosis grounded on in-court examination, the information adduced may provide
insight in evaluating the behavioral pathology of a witness and hence ought be
admitted.

126

A. CooxE, A GENERATION ON TRIAL 305 (1950).
127 Id. at 311.
128 N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1950, at 12, col. 4.
129 Id., Jan. 12, 1950, at 9, col. 1.
130 Slovenko, supra note 46, at 12.
131 For a sampling of the commentaries the case provoked, see A. CooxE, supra note 125;
Falknor, Evidence, 1950 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 804; Frank, JudicialFact-Finding and Psychology, 14 OHIo ST. L.J. 183 (1953); Jones, Admission of Psychiatric Testimony in Alger
Hiss Trial, 11 ALA. LAW. 212 (1950); Roche, Truth Telling, Psychiatric Expert Testimony
and the Impeachment of Witnesses, 22 PA. B.A.Q. 140 (1951).
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IV. Conclusion
Psychiatric testimony regarding the credibility of a witness, whether based
on clinical examination or courtroom observation, ought be admitted in an
effort to maximize the jury's ability to render a fair and just verdict. This testimony, in order to be of assistance to the jury, must be presented in a clear, intelligible fashion and must be designed to instruct, not to confuse, the triers of
fact. The procedure that will produce the most reliable assistance to the jury is
the clinical diagnosis by a panel of neutral experts. " Courts must recognize
the development of the principles of psychiatry and psychoanalysis to the extent
that the discretionary powers vested in courts to admit or bar such testimony
ought be exercised, guided by a judicial standard of liberal admissibility. In this
way, the judicial process can live up to a higher standard, prescribed not by
judicial fiat but by universal moral belief: "Thou shalt not bear false witness
'1 3
against thy neighbor.

132 See SPECIAL COMM. N.Y. CITY BAR ASS'N, A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL EXPERT
TESTIMONY PROJECT, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY (1956).
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Exodus 20:16.

